{"id":12390,"date":"2026-08-26T08:38:13","date_gmt":"2026-08-26T08:38:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cryptonews.uk.com\/?p=12390"},"modified":"2026-08-26T08:38:13","modified_gmt":"2026-08-26T08:38:13","slug":"a-zero-balance-bug-let-empty-wallets-seize-control-of-82-provenance-assets","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cryptonews.uk.com\/?p=12390","title":{"rendered":"A zero-balance bug let empty wallets seize control of 82 Provenance assets"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/p>\n

\n

Trail of Bits disclosed a Provenance Blockchain authorization flaw that it said exposed 82 live mainnet asset accounts to takeover. A successful abuse could let someone mint an affected token or withdraw assets held in escrow.<\/p>\n

Those special asset accounts, called markers, govern a token’s supply, permissions, and escrow balance. The security firm said the flaw allowed a user who held none of a marker’s tokens to take its admin, mint, and withdrawal permissions, then act on them in a second transaction.<\/p>\n

The bug came from a mismatch between two records of token supply. For non-fixed markers, Provenance’s bank module tracks live circulating supply, while the marker’s supply field can remain at zero.<\/p>\n

The authorization check read the stale marker field when testing whether an account held the entire supply. Because a new account’s balance was also zero, the check treated zero as equal to zero and approved the permission change.<\/p>\n

Trail of Bits said all 82 affected markers had zero stored supply while carrying real circulating supply or assets in escrow.<\/p>\n

The disclosed affected nhash escrow totaled roughly 30 quadrillion nhash, worth about $500,000 at HASH prices when the issue was discovered. Three Provenance Blockchain Foundation programs held most of it: grant0051 held about 19.23 quadrillion nhash, provenance.validator.incentive.program held about 8.56 quadrillion, and grant0077 held about 2.49 quadrillion.<\/p>\n

A distinct 74-marker token subset, included within the total of 82, faced unauthorized minting risk. It spanned bridged stablecoins and wrapped assets, consortium deposits, tokenized mortgage participations, and yield tokens.<\/p>\n

Named examples included uusd.trading, uusdc.figure.se, nbtc.figure.se, cusd.deposit, cguaranteedrateomni, chomebridgeomni, nuva.ylds, and uylds.fcc.<\/p>\n

\n

Related Reading<\/span><\/p>\n

SEC approves Figures Markets’ new yield-bearing stablecoin YLDS<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

<\/span> <\/div>\n

Trail of Bits described a direct inflation risk for unrestricted coin-type markers. Restricted tokens with identity requirements faced supply-integrity and solvency risks even if an attacker could not freely transfer newly created units.<\/p>\n