{"id":13600,"date":"2026-09-23T08:43:57","date_gmt":"2026-09-23T08:43:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cryptonews.uk.com\/?p=13600"},"modified":"2026-09-23T08:43:57","modified_gmt":"2026-09-23T08:43:57","slug":"eu-central-banks-attack-mica-rules-and-stablecoin-runs-are-blamed","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cryptonews.uk.com\/?p=13600","title":{"rendered":"EU central banks attack MiCA rules and stablecoin runs are blamed"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Europe\u2019s central banks want the European Union to rethink a rule designed to make stablecoins safer, but that can also link a token run directly to the banking system.<\/p>\n
For reserve amounts tied to official currencies, MiCA currently requires issuers of non-significant tokens to keep at least 30% as deposits with EU credit institutions. The floor rises to 60% for significant tokens, according to the European Banking Authority\u2019s technical standards.<\/p>\n
Reuters and Cinco D\u00edas reported Sept. 22 that the European System of Central Banks wants that fixed minimum removed. Deposits would remain eligible, while reserve safety would turn on how much could become cash within one or five working days.<\/p>\n
The position is input to the European Commission\u2019s review of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation. The consultation runs through Sept. 30, and the Commission says the responses may inform a later legislative proposal.<\/p>\n
That leaves a policy question open: can Europe loosen the link between stablecoins and bank funding while preserving the liquidity needed for redemptions?<\/p>\n
How MiCA\u2019s deposit floor creates a two-way channel<\/h2>\n
Bank deposits give an issuer cash it can use when token holders redeem. Yet a deposit is also a claim on a bank, and a mandatory allocation makes the token\u2019s reserve quality partly dependent on the condition of the institutions holding that money.<\/p>\n
During the March 2023 banking turmoil, Circle held part of USDC\u2019s reserves at Silicon Valley Bank, and uncertainty over access to those funds pressured the token\u2019s peg. USDC\u2019s market capitalization fell 26% over a month, according to an ECB analysis.<\/p>\n
An issuer facing heavy withdrawals may pull large bank deposits at once, so stablecoin reserves that had looked like funding to a receiving bank can then behave like flighty wholesale money.<\/p>\n
An ECB speech described how redemptions could force a stablecoin issuer to withdraw reserves and pressure a bank\u2019s liquidity. An ECB working paper added that issuers may concentrate their deposits among a small number of banks.<\/p>\n
Euro-denominated stablecoins had a market capitalization of about \u20ac450 million in January 2026, compared with roughly $300 billion for dollar-denominated tokens. Crypto-platform and stablecoin deposits also remain small relative to the assets of exposed euro-area banks.<\/p>\n
The policy concern centers on the concentration and behavior of reserve deposits if adoption grows.<\/p>\n
A fixed quota can create two reciprocal exposures. Bank distress can impair the reserves behind a token, while a token run can drain a bank’s funding. The rule improves immediate access to money in ordinary conditions, but it also determines where stress first lands.<\/p>\n
The reported ESCB alternative focuses on the redemption timetable. For official-currency tokens, it would use existing EBA liquidity buckets: at least 20% of reserves available within one working day and 30% within five days for non-significant tokens.<\/p>\n
The thresholds rise to 40% and 60% for significant tokens. Those tests preserve a near-cash buffer while allowing issuers to meet it with a broader regulated mix of assets.<\/p>\n
What a maturity test changes<\/h2>\n
The proposal would replace a rule about where a set share of reserves must sit with a test of how quickly the whole reserve can produce cash.<\/p>\n
\n\n
\n
Feature<\/th>\n
Current MiCA framework<\/th>\n
Reported ESCB approach<\/th>\n
Main effect<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
\n
\n
Bank deposits<\/td>\n
At least 30% for non-significant tokens and 60% for significant tokens<\/td>\n
No fixed minimum deposit share<\/td>\n
Deposits remain eligible while issuers gain allocation flexibility<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n
One-day liquidity<\/td>\n
Part of the wider reserve framework<\/td>\n
At least 20% for non-significant tokens and 40% for significant tokens<\/td>\n
At least 30% for non-significant tokens and 60% for significant tokens<\/td>\n
Adds a broader near-cash buffer<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n
Reserve exposure<\/td>\n
A mandated share sits with commercial banks<\/td>\n
More room for short-term securities and reverse repos<\/td>\n
Bank linkage falls as market exposure rises<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\nA reported ESCB test sets one-day liquidity at 20%\u201340% and five-day liquidity at 30%\u201360%, depending on token significance.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
Under the EBA framework, withdrawable cash and reverse repurchase agreements that can be terminated within the relevant window can count toward the thresholds. Specified highly liquid financial instruments can also qualify, while short maturity alone does not make an asset eligible.<\/p>\n
![\"MiCA](\"https:\/\/cryptoslate.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/Photos_EYwwkZe9zT.jpg\")