{"id":13884,"date":"2026-09-30T01:24:47","date_gmt":"2026-09-30T01:24:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cryptonews.uk.com\/?p=13884"},"modified":"2026-09-30T01:24:47","modified_gmt":"2026-09-30T01:24:47","slug":"sentora-split-50-aave-revenue-but-suppliers-absorb-all-losses","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cryptonews.uk.com\/?p=13884","title":{"rendered":"Sentora split 50% Aave revenue, but suppliers absorb all losses"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Aave DAO would own the contracts for a proposed Ethereum lending market, but Sentora would make the day-to-day decisions that shape its credit risk.<\/p>\n

In a governance proposal posted Sept. 28, the DeFi risk manager asks to operate an isolated Aave V4 Hub and its lending Spokes through revocable roles. The split puts an immediate risk response in Sentora\u2019s hands and leaves the DAO with ownership, a review path for new markets and the power to withdraw those roles.<\/p>\n

Sentora would choose its collateral, interest-rate curves, liquidation settings, and oracles. Aave\u2019s existing risk service providers would have no assignment to monitor the instance, recommend changes, or respond to incidents.<\/p>\n

The proposal is still an ARFC for community discussion, and the next steps include a Snapshot vote followed by an on-chain Aave Improvement Proposal before any approval.<\/p>\n

Who can act, and when<\/h2>\n

Aave V4 separates the Hub that holds liquidity from the Spokes where loans originate against collateral. Sentora proposes one Ethereum Hub for its Spokes, with no credit lines to or from other Aave DAO Hubs, and its own Spokes would still draw from suppliers in Sentora\u2019s Hub.<\/p>\n

The proposal limits borrowable assets to RLUSD, PYUSD, and OUSD, excluding USDC and USDT.<\/p>\n

Under the plan, the DAO\u2019s Governance Short Executor would retain the admin roles over the Hub, Spokes, and AccessManager. The DAO would retain contract upgrades and role grants, and Sentora would own none of the contracts.<\/p>\n

Instead, it would receive operational roles to manage the markets, and the DAO could revoke those grants through an on-chain governance proposal.<\/p>\n

Those roles create different response times:<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Proposed action<\/th>\nWho acts<\/th>\nWhen<\/th>\nDAO recourse<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Pause or freeze a reserve, halt an asset or Spoke<\/td>\nSentora operational address<\/td>\nImmediately through a restrictive role<\/td>\nRevoke Sentora\u2019s roles through governance<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Reduce a collateral factor or tighten a cap<\/td>\nSentora through a one-way Risk Steward<\/td>\nImmediately<\/td>\nRevoke Sentora\u2019s roles through governance<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Increase risk, or change a rate model or liquidation configuration<\/td>\nSentora operational address<\/td>\nAfter a 48-hour on-chain delay<\/td>\nObserve the scheduled change and pursue role revocation; no individual cancellation power is specified<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Add collateral or deploy another Hub<\/td>\nSentora proposes; an appointed DAO service provider may object<\/td>\nTwo-week forum review before scheduling or deployment<\/td>\nAn objection pauses the action for a binding Snapshot vote<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

The 48-hour delay applies to risk increases and to functions whose direction is ambiguous, including rate models and liquidation configurations. The proposal sets no limit on the size of an increase and no cooldown between updates.<\/p>\n

The delay makes a scheduled action visible, but the DAO would have no mechanism to cancel that one action inside the window. Revoking Sentora\u2019s roles would require a separate on-chain governance proposal and would remove its authority going forward.<\/p>\n

For a new Hub or collateral asset, Sentora would post an analysis and wait two weeks. An objection from any appointed Aave DAO service provider would stop the rollout and send it to a binding Snapshot vote.<\/p>\n

The same proposal says no service provider is scoped or compensated to review these submissions. It also excludes the instance from the providers\u2019 monitoring, parameter-recommendation, and incident-response mandates.<\/p>\n

Providers could raise concerns on their own initiative, but a quiet review window would not establish that anyone examined the change. The proposed veto depends on someone noticing a problem and choosing to object.<\/p>\n